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INTRODUCTION
Not all attorneys are angels.  During litigation, situations arise 
where a judge will feel the need to criticize an attorney’s conduct.  It 
could be through remarks off the record, through a sanction and fine 
for something like a Rule 111 violation, or any number of methods in 
between.  However, not all federal district court judges are infallible, 
and criticism, especially on the record or in a published opinion, can 
have severe repercussions on an attorney’s reputation and livelihood.  
What options for appellate-level review does a chastised attorney cur-
rently have?  What options should she have? 
This Comment explores the circuit split concerning an attorney’s 
ability to appeal on her own behalf from a district court proceeding in 
which she is not a party.  From a strict requirement that the district 
court actually fine the attorney2 to a requirement that the court make 
findings of misconduct,3 circuits have drawn different lines to limit 
appellate jurisdiction.  The circuits have been split on the issue of 
when an attorney can bring an appeal on her own behalf for some 
time,4 but the Supreme Court has shown no interest in resolving the 
issue.  As recently as October 2007, the Supreme Court denied certio-
rari on an appeal from the Seventh Circuit’s reaffirmation of its posi-
tion in Seymour v. Hug.5  This Comment argues that federal courts 
should have jurisdiction to hear appeals based on specific findings 
1  Unless otherwise stated, “Rule” in this comment refers to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
2 See, e.g., Seymour v. Hug, 485 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[A]n attorney can 
bring an appeal on her own behalf when challenging a district court decision imposing 
monetary sanctions on the attorney, but this rule does not allow an appeal of otherwise 
critical comments when no monetary sanctions have been imposed.”), cert. denied, 128 
S. Ct. 302 (2007).  The Seventh Circuit alone holds this position. 
3 The Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits follow variations of this approach.  See
infra Section II.C. 
4 Compare Seymour, 485 F.3d at 929 (requiring monetary sanctions), with Williams v. 
United States (In re Williams), 156 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 1998) (requiring formal desig-
nation of a sanction, though not a monetary fine), and Sullivan v. Comm. on Admis-
sions & Grievances, 395 F.2d 954, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (allowing appeals from mere 
findings of misconduct, because the “determination plainly reflects adversely on his 
professional reputation”).
5 128 S. Ct. 302 (2007). 
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that an attorney engaged in misconduct during litigation before the 
district court, even when monetary fines or other formal sanctions 
have not been imposed. 
Though this circuit split has existed for well over a decade, schol-
arship addressing it has been limited until recently.  Two student 
comments reviewing the split have been published within the past 
year, suggesting different resolutions.6  One argues for a resolution 
similar to the resolution endorsed here;7 this Comment, however, not 
only discusses and evaluates the rationales and concerns offered by 
the courts of appeals themselves, but also brings in larger systemic 
themes from the areas of appellate jurisdiction and review.  Allowing 
appeals from findings of misconduct, from findings that an attorney 
has violated a specific legal or ethical duty, fits within the general ex-
ception for nonparty appeals and has the additional benefits of pro-
viding greater appellate control of judges and clarifying proper attor-
ney conduct through increased oversight and opportunity for 
appellate review.  Allowing appeals from findings of misconduct both 
addresses the concerns raised by the courts of appeals and best serves 
the larger goals and constraints of the appellate system. 
Part I starts with a brief look at the law of appellate jurisdiction 
and the hurdles that attorneys face in the form of general jurisdic-
tional rules.  As this Comment explains, these rules are already subject 
to many exceptions.  Part I also provides important context with which 
to evaluate the various approaches by the courts of appeals.  Part II 
details the current state of the circuit split, highlighting the rationales 
and fears that each circuit has raised in deciding the issue.  Part III 
considers what the law should be in light of legal precedent and pol-
icy; it extends the discussion beyond the explicit concerns of the cir-
6 Compare Carla R. Pasquale, Note, Scolded:  Can an Attorney Appeal a District Court’s 
Order Finding Professional Misconduct?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 219, 242-43 (2008) (recom-
mending allowing appeals from “sanctions that could damage that attorney’s profes-
sional reputation”), with Robert B. Tannenbaum, Comment, Misbehaving Attorneys, An-
gry Judges, and the Need for a Balanced Approach to the Reviewability of Findings of Misconduct,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1857, 1858 (2008) (developing a hybrid rule—“a ‘formality/harm’ 
test that emphasizes both content and context when assessing which findings of mis-
conduct constitute a sanction”—based on the principle that courts review judgments, 
not opinions). 
7 See Pasquale, supra note 6, at 242-48; infra Part III.  While the recommendations 
of the two pieces are similar, the justifications come from different angles.  Pasquale 
provides policy justifications but largely limits discussion to those concerns raised by 
the courts themselves.  See, e.g., Pasquale, supra note 6, at 244-48.  This Comment, how-
ever, provides additional policy justifications for the rule—particularly in subsection 
III.B.2.
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cuits by placing the debate in the larger context of appellate jurisdic-
tion and appellate review, including the usefulness of promoting uni-
form attorney conduct in the federal courts and checking abuses by 
the district courts.  Ultimately, it is the rule allowing appeals from ex-
plicit findings of attorney misconduct that best serves these larger 
goals.
I. HURDLES TO APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The appellate courts have framed the issue of attorney appeals as 
a dispute over the boundaries of federal appellate jurisdiction, with a 
focus on the statutory requirement of a “final order”8 and the limits 
on standing based on judicial interpretations of the Article III “case or 
controversy” requirement.9  Both of these jurisdictional grants are 
filled with intricacy, nuance, and pitfalls.10  While a comprehensive re-
view of appellate jurisdiction in federal courts is beyond the scope of 
this Comment, certain general rules are necessary to frame the issues 
analyzed and discussed in Parts II and III. 
A.  Nonparties 
A fundamental general rule of appellate litigation is that only 
named parties can appeal a final judgment, even if a nonparty’s inter-
ests are harmed by it.11  There are, of course, various exceptions to this 
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (granting jurisdiction to all courts of appeals except 
the Federal Circuit for “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the 
United States”); id. § 1295(a) (providing the comparable statutory grant of jurisdiction 
for the Federal Circuit). 
9 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
10 See generally Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV.
1237 (2007) (analyzing appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders); Joan Stein-
man, Irregulars:  The Appellate Rights of Persons Who Are Not Full-Fledged Parties, 39 GA. L.
REV 411, 484-517 (2005) [hereinafter Steinman, Irregulars] (surveying the standing of 
various classes of nonparty appellants and appellees); Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in 
a Dim Corner:  Standing To Appeal and the Right To Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts,
38 GA. L. REV. 813 (2004) [hereinafter Steinman, Shining] (comparing and contrasting 
standing to appeal with standing to sue and other appellate issues).
11 See Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (per curiam) (“The rule that only 
parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse 
judgment, is well settled.”); Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 77-78 (1987) (dismissing for 
lack of jurisdiction an appeal by presiding officers of the state legislature who had in-
tervened on behalf of the legislature but left office prior to the appeal); Ex parte Leaf 
Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 222 U.S. 578, 581 (1911) (per curiam) (“One who is not a party 
to a record and judgment is not entitled to appeal therefrom.”). 
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general rule.12  Among those nonparties who can appeal orders are 
those found in contempt,13 witnesses disputing the amount of a fee 
paid to them,14 and attorneys who have been sanctioned and fined.15
As explained by the Federal Circuit in Nisus Corp. v. Perma-Chink Sys-
tems, Inc., the theory behind exceptions such as these is that they form 
a side action to the main case, and by rendering judgment against a 
nonparty, the court has in effect made it a party to that judgment 
only.16  Thus, a necessary step for a chastised attorney will be to show 
that there was a judicial decision directed by the court specifically 
against her.  A related inquiry, and one that has split the circuits on 
the issue of attorney appeals, is what exactly counts as a sufficient judi-
cial decision. 
B. Judgments, Not Opinions 
Another time-honored axiom of appellate review is that courts re-
view judgments, not opinions.17  Put another way, appellate courts will 
not look at the findings of an opinion except as they relate to the ul-
timate judgment.  This prohibition becomes important when attor-
neys attempt to appeal from findings of misconduct rather than from 
formal sanction orders. 
This also becomes important when a winning party seeks review of 
otherwise negative findings in a judgment.  Generally, a party that is 
12 See generally Steinman, Irregulars, supra note 10, at 484-517 (exploring nonparty 
standing to appeal). 
13 See U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 
74 (1988) (hearing the appeal of a nonparty witness from a finding of civil contempt). 
14 See Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 185 (1991) (hearing an appeal from 
a prisoner who was denied a witness fee after testifying in another’s trial), superseded by 
statute, Incarcerated Witness Fees Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-417, 106 Stat. 2138 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1821(f) (2006)). 
15 See infra Part II (discussing the general acceptance of an attorney’s ability to ap-
peal from a money judgment against her). 
16 497 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  As the Federal Circuit explained, 
when a court imposes a sanction on an attorney, it is not adjudicating the legal 
rights of the parties appearing before it in the underlying case.  Instead, the 
court is exercising its inherent power to regulate the proceedings before it.  
Once that power to punish is exercised, the matter becomes personal to the 
sanctioned individual and is treated as a judgment against him. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
17 See, e.g., Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 297-98 (1956) (“This Court . . . re-
views judgments, not statements in opinions. . . . [I]t is our duty to look beyond the 
broad sweep of the language and determine for ourselves precisely the ground on 
which the judgment rests.” (citations omitted)). 
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successful in the judgment is not allowed to appeal.18  The Supreme 
Court explored the underpinnings of this policy in Deposit Guaranty 
National Bank v. Roper.19  The Court based the rule on the interpreta-
tion of the jurisdictional statutes and of historical practice rather than 
on Article III.20  Because the rule is not constitutionally compelled, the 
Court acknowledged that in certain cases a successful party may ap-
peal “an adverse ruling collateral to the judgment” if the party still 
meets other Article III standing requirements.21  The important in-
quiry is whether, despite the successful judgment, the prevailing party 
retains a sufficient “stake in the appeal.”22  Findings that might have 
preclusive effect, for example, could give standing for appellate re-
view, notwithstanding the fact that the judgment was in the party’s fa-
vor.23  These appeals are from findings, and not the judgment itself, 
and therefore provide an exception to the rule that might be instruc-
tive to attorneys appealing findings of misconduct. 
C. Injury Sufficient To Give Independent Standing 
In addition to the judgment requirement discussed above, courts 
have interpreted Article III as requiring an appellant to show injury 
resulting from a court’s decision in order to have appellate standing.24
When monetary sanctions are involved, the attorney’s personal stake 
in the appeal is clear.  Where no fines have been imposed, however, 
the issue turns on whether potential injury to a lawyer’s reputation is 
sufficient to grant appellate standing.  The Supreme Court has not di-
18 See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980) (“Ordinarily, 
only a party aggrieved by a judgment or order of a district court may exercise the statu-
tory right to appeal therefrom.  A party who receives all that he has sought generally is 
not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and cannot appeal from it.”); Lind-
heimer v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151, 176 (1934) (denying the ability of a party to 
appeal a favorable judgment in order to have the district court’s findings reviewed). 
19 Roper, 445 U.S. at 333-34. 
20 Id.
21 Id. at 334. 
22 Id.; see also Elec. Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241, 242 (1939) 
(ordering the court of appeals to hear the prevailing party below’s appeal and order 
the district court to reform its decree on the validity of a disputed patent, even 
“though the [patent] adjudication was immaterial to the disposition of the cause”). 
23 See, e.g., Ashley v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms. (In re DES Litig.), 7 F.3d 20, 23 
(2d Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that findings that have collateral estoppel effect can 
aggrieve a party such that it is excepted from the general rule preventing appeals by 
prevailing parties). 
24 See generally Steinman, Shining, supra note 10, at 839-44 (discussing the various 
bases for standing requirements at the appellate level). 
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rectly addressed this point with respect to lawyers, but it has in the 
past found that a showing of damage to reputation is sufficient to give 
standing.25  As Part II will show, most circuits that have explored the 
issue have found that damage to reputation and the resulting mone-
tary damage through loss of business is likewise sufficient. 
II. DIFFERING APPROACHES TO ATTORNEY APPEALS IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
Before surveying the circuits’ various approaches, it is worth dis-
cussing a point on which they all agree:  the availability of appeal from 
monetary fines.  It seems settled that an attorney can appeal a mone-
tary sanction resulting from Rule 11 or Rule 37 violations and the like.  
In Cunningham v. Hamilton County, for example, the Court was asked 
to decide whether a Rule 37(a) sanction for misconduct during dis-
covery could be immediately appealed.26  The discussion centered on 
whether such a sanction could be considered a “final order” under the 
collateral order doctrine, which would be sufficient to give the appel-
late courts jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.27  No attention was 
given to the uncontroversial notion that a nonparty attorney could 
challenge such a sanction on the appellate level.  Like a nonparty held 
in contempt,28 a fined attorney can seek a second opinion.29  Having 
25 See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 475-76 (1987) (finding that, in the First 
Amendment context, potential damage to a citizen’s reputation for showing a film la-
beled by the government as “political propaganda” satisfied the injury component of 
the standing requirement). 
26 527 U.S. 198, 202 (1999). 
27 Id. at 203-10.  The collateral order doctrine provides that one may appeal an 
order without a final judgment only when the order is “conclusive, . . . resolve[s] im-
portant questions separate from the merits, and . . . [is] effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.”  Id. at 198 (alterations in 
original) (quoting Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995)). 
28 See U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 
76 (1988) (“The right of a nonparty to appeal an adjudication of contempt cannot be 
questioned.”). 
29 Dispute over the ability of fined attorneys to appeal has focused on the proce-
dure of the appeal.  See Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 200 (finding that sanction for Rule 
37(a)(4) violation did not itself constitute a “final decision” allowing for immediate 
appeal); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (setting the stan-
dard of review for Rule 11 sanctions to be abuse of discretion “for all aspects” of the 
lower court's decision).  Various appellate decisions have held that the attorney alone 
can appeal a sanction, rather than the client, since only the attorney has proper stand-
ing.  See Reynolds v. E. Dyer Dev. Co., 882 F.2d 1249, 1254 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[Plaintiffs] 
purport to appeal the Rule 11 sanctions . . . . They cannot do that.  The attorney . . . is 
the real party in interest, and must appeal in his own name.”); Marshak v. Tonetti, 813 
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identified the common ground uniting the circuits, it is time to ex-
plore how, and why, they depart. 
A.  Most Restrictive:  The Seventh Circuit’s Approach 
Only the Seventh Circuit has refused to extend the availability of 
appeal for a reproached attorney beyond cases involving monetary 
sanctions.30  Instead of an appeal, this circuit endorses the availability 
of a writ of mandamus to compel a district court to strike excessive 
language.31
In Bolte v. Home Insurance Co. a district court had found that attor-
neys for the defendant concealed evidence from the plaintiff.32  In an 
order granting the plaintiff a new trial, the court went so far as to set a 
date for a hearing to determine if sanctions were appropriate.33  The 
case was dismissed before that date, but the original findings re-
mained on the record.  The reproached attorneys appealed, claiming 
damage to reputation and the possibility of later disciplinary proceed-
ings.  The Seventh Circuit was quick to point out that this appeal was 
from findings of a lower court, and not from the actual judgment 
granting a new trial.34
The court addressed two policy concerns that it felt would be im-
plicated if it were to allow attorneys to appeal unfavorable findings.  
First, it reasoned that granting such an appeal would vastly expand 
appellate jurisdiction.35  Not only lawyers, but also anyone able to show 
concrete injury resulting from a judicial opinion (not just a judgment) 
would be able to appeal.  The court was unwilling to go this far, citing 
“congested appellate dockets.”36  Second, it noted concern over the 
lack of an adversarial nature to the appeal.  Since the plaintiff below 
F.2d 13, 21 (1st Cir. 1987) (“Since the award must be paid by [the attorney] alone, 
plaintiff has no pecuniary or, we think, other sufficient interest in the award to confer 
standing to appeal.”). 
30 See Seymour v. Hug, 485 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 302 
(2007); Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., 972 F.2d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1992); Bolte 
v. Home Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 572, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1984). 
31 See, e.g., Bolte, 744 F.2d at 573 (“If there is any remedy for the wrong that the ap-
pellants allege, it is to seek a writ of mandamus against the district judge under 28 
U.S.C. § 1651.”). 
32 Id. at 572. 
33 See id. (“The judge described the lawyers’ conduct as reprehensible . . . .” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). 
34 Id.
35 Id. at 573. 
36 Id.
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had not been awarded the revenue from the sanctions, there would be 
no one with a stake in the outcome to defend the opinion.37
The court discussed two additional points that would prove im-
portant to other circuits.  First, it seemed to acknowledge, or at least 
consider, that damage to reputation is sufficient to satisfy the standing 
requirements of Article III.38  The court also acknowledged that, in the 
case before it, the findings of misconduct and the district court’s deci-
sion to let them stand did amount to a kind of sanction for the attor-
neys.39  In denying the lawyers’ appeal, the court acknowledged that 
the appellants had standing and did not seem overly concerned that 
the appeal arose from an opinion, not from a judgment.  Instead, it 
found that pragmatic, prudential reasons (limitations on judicial re-
sources and the nonadversarial nature of the appeal) outweighed the 
attorneys’ claim. 
Bolte is still good law in the Seventh Circuit.  Quite recently, the 
Seventh Circuit had the opportunity to review its monetary-sanction 
requirement in Seymour v. Hug.40  While acknowledging the current 
circuit split, the court reaffirmed its holding in Bolte, adding that the 
Seventh Circuit favors clear, easily applied, mechanical rules for de-
termining jurisdiction.41  Again, the court’s focus was on practicality. 
B. Formalist Middle Ground 
A group of circuits have attempted to draw a new line to deter-
mine whether an appeal of judicial criticism is allowed.  While unwill-
ing to restrict appeals to cases involving monetary fines, the First and 
Federal Circuits have sought out another firm guideline for appellate 
jurisdiction:  any formal reprimand or sanction, whether or not fines 
were attached.42
37 Id.
38 See id. (drawing an analogy to defamation). 
39 See id. (“[A]lthough sanctions in the usual sense were not imposed, the judge’s 
refusal to vacate his earlier finding of misconduct imposed or confirmed a sanction of 
sorts, in a realistic though not formal sense, on the lawyers.”). 
40 485 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2007). 
41 Id. at 929 (quoting both Bolte, 744 F.2d at 573, and Hoagland ex rel. Midwest 
Transit, Inc. v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 
2004)).
42 See Nisus Corp. v. Perma-Chink Sys., Inc., 497 F.3d 1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(“We have taken the position that a court’s order that criticizes an attorney and that is 
intended to be a ‘formal judicial action’ in a disciplinary proceeding is an appealable 
decision . . . .”); Williams v. United States (In re Williams), 156 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 
1998) (“Sanctions are not limited to monetary imposts.  Words alone may suffice if 
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The First Circuit’s reasoning in Williams v. United States sets the 
tone for this line of cases.43  Two attorneys representing the United 
States in bankruptcy court were subject to sanctions under Rule 37(b) 
for failure to timely produce requested discovery documents.44  The 
order imposed monetary sanctions and contained harsh findings 
about the attorneys’ conduct.45  The sanctions were annulled by the 
district court on technical grounds, but the factual findings relating to 
the attorneys’ conduct were not vacated.46  The attorneys appealed, 
arguing that these findings, which were in a published opinion, 
amounted to sanctions “in the form of a public reprimand,” which 
damaged their reputation.47
In denying the appeal, the court emphasized both the need to 
appeal from an order or judgment, not findings, and the fact that the 
court could have expressly reprimanded the attorneys if it chose to.48
Instead, it imposed sanctions that were later dropped.  As to whether a 
monetary fine was required, however, the court was emphatic:  “Let us 
be perfectly clear.  Sanctions are not limited to monetary imposts.  
they are expressly identified as a reprimand.”).  While originally following the First 
Circuit’s reasoning in Williams, the Ninth Circuit has since decided that a specific find-
ing of misconduct in the form of a rules violation, absent monetary sanctions or ex-
plicit mention of reprimand, is itself equivalent to a formal reprimand.  See United 
States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2000). 
43 156 F.3d at 91.  The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Williams in setting the stan-
dard for its own jurisdiction.  See Weissman v. Quail Lodge Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1200 
(9th Cir. 1999) (“We agree with the holding of Williams that words alone will constitute 
a sanction only if they are expressly identified as a reprimand.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  The Federal Circuit, while not quite as explicitly adopting the Wil-
liams position, seems to have come to the same conclusion.  See Precision Specialty 
Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  Precision Specialty quoted 
both Williams and Weissman extensively, id. at 1351-52, and adopted their language in 
allowing an appeal from a finding of a Rule 11 violation, despite the lack of monetary 
sanctions, holding that “[t]he reprimand was explicit and formal, imposed as a sanction.”
Id. at 1352 (emphasis added).  The opinion also rejected appeals for informal criti-
cism, just like the First Circuit:  “Nothing in this decision should be taken as suggest-
ing, or even intimating, that other kinds of judicial criticisms of lawyers’ actions, 
whether contained in judicial opinions or comments in the courtroom, are also di-
rectly reviewable.”  Id. at 1353. 
44 Williams, 156 F.3d at 88. 
45 See id. (quoting the original order, which characterized one of the attorneys’ 
testimony as “pure baloney” and the other’s “performance and credibility [as] at about 
the same level”). 
46 Id. at 89. 
47 Id. at 90. 
48 Id.
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Words alone may suffice if they are expressly identified as a repri-
mand.”49
Why was the court adamant about requiring an express repri-
mand, even in the case of extremely critical50—and published—
judicial commentary?  The First Circuit shared the Seventh Circuit’s 
concern that if it acknowledged that judicial criticism could amount 
to a “de facto sanction,” it would have no principled way to decide 
when a statement by a judge was harsh enough to count as a sanc-
tion.51  It rejected an inquiry into whether the trial judge intended the 
comments to be a sanction, which was the position that the dissent 
encouraged, as being too subjective.52  Relying on damage to reputa-
tion as the crucial tipping point that would broaden the right of ap-
peal to nonlawyers who are criticized, like the court in Bolte, the First 
Circuit was unwilling to endorse so broad an extension of appellate 
jurisdiction.53  Also like the Bolte court, the First Circuit in Williams
raised a concern about the lack of an adversarial position from mere 
judicial criticism, as the opposing side would have no incentive or rea-
son to defend the opinion.54
A more pointed policy objection raised by the court was the possi-
ble chilling effect on trial judges of allowing such appeals.  Concern 
over appeals may lead judges to limit their criticism and may reduce 
their ability to maintain order in the courtroom and “preside effec-
tively over discovery and trials.”55  Analogizing to judicial immunity 
from defamation liability, the court found that the benefit of promoting 
judicial candor outweighed the harm from instances of judicial abuse.56
In allowing appeals in cases where no fines have been assessed, 
these courts recognize that reputational damage is itself sufficient in-
jury to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.  As the 
Federal Circuit stated in Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States,
“[a] lawyer’s reputation is one of his most important professional as-
49 Id. at 92. 
50 The court itself characterized the findings as “unnecessarily strident.”  Id. at 93. 
51 Id. at 91. 
52 Id.
53 Id.  The Federal Circuit echoed this reasoning in Nisus Corp. v. Perma-Chink Sys-
tems, Inc., 497 F.3d 1316, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
54 Williams, 156 F.3d at 91.  Given that the court would allow appeals from sanc-
tions involving words alone, it is not clear why this objection has any more weight when 
applied to de facto sanctions.  In neither case would there be a party with an interest in 
defending the opinion. 
55 Id. at 92. 
56 Id.
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sets.  Indeed, such a reprimand may have a more serious adverse im-
pact upon a lawyer than the imposition of a monetary sanction.”57
There are, however, variations in the cases as to what is sufficiently 
formal to warrant an appeal.  Williams made it seem as if only some-
thing explicitly called a reprimand or an actual sanction order would 
suffice.58  The Federal Circuit uses a slightly different wording from 
the First Circuit’s; it requires “a formal judicial action” criticizing an 
attorney.59  When clarifying language from a previous opinion that 
“sanctions or findings” could be grounds for standing, the Federal 
Circuit stated that the phrase refers to “formal imposition of the 
court’s inherent power to penalize those who appear before it” and 
not just to findings that an attorney has engaged in misconduct or be-
haved inappropriately.60
C. Findings of Misconduct 
The remaining circuits that have weighed in on the issue favor al-
lowing appeals from findings that an attorney engaged in misconduct 
(“misconduct appeals”).61  “Misconduct” in these situations would in-
clude a violation by an attorney of a legal or ethical duty, such as vio-
57 315 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also id. (allowing an appeal from a for-
mal sanction, even though the opinion was unpublished); Williams, 156 F.3d at 90 (“It 
is trite, but true, that a lawyer’s professional reputation is his stock in trade, and blem-
ishes may prove harmful in a myriad of ways.”). 
58 But see Young v. City of Providence ex rel. Napolitano, 404 F.3d 33, 37-38 (1st Cir. 
2005) (allowing an appeal from an order finding that three attorneys had violated 
Rule 11).  Even though sanctions were only imposed on two of the three appellants in 
Young, and though the sanctions were merely censure for one and admonishment for 
another, all three were allowed to appeal the finding of a Rule 11 violation.  Id. Young
might signal a softening within the First Circuit of the formalistic stance with which it 
has become associated.  The attorneys in Young, however, were still appealing from an 
order against them and not just from a finding of misconduct in an opinion.  Id.; see
also Sterling Consulting Corp. v. IRS (In re Indian Motorcycle Co.), 452 F.3d 25, 28 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (describing the holding in Williams as “based on the distinction between an 
order and a finding, and on the principle that courts review findings only so far as they 
do underpin orders”). 
59 Nisus Corp. v. Perma-Chink Sys., Inc., 497 F.3d 1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
The standard seems equivalent to the “formal reprimand” of Williams, however.  156 
F.3d at 91. 
60 Nisus Corp., 497 F.3d at 1321. 
61 See Butler v. Biocore Med. Techs., Inc., 348 F.3d 1163, 1167-69 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that orders finding ethical violations are appealable); Walker v. City of Mes-
quite, 129 F.3d 831, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1997) (allowing appeal of a court’s reprimand 
that found a lawyer guilty of misconduct); Sullivan v. Comm. on Admissions & Griev-
ances, 395 F.2d 954, 954-56 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (discussing the appeal of a “proscribed 
conduct” finding). 
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lating a rule of professional conduct or Rule 11.  This approach 
broadens appellate review but still provides a clear standard to guide 
the lower courts and cabins the ability to appeal. 
The Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence is instructive, as the Circuit 
used to follow the formal-reprimand rule.62  Now, however, it allows 
appeals from a formal finding that an attorney has violated a specific 
rule of conduct, even if no sanctions are imposed and the finding is 
not expressly called a reprimand.63  As the court explained in United 
States v. Talao, such a finding itself constitutes a sanction, whether or 
not the opinion contains a phrase stating that the finding is a formal 
reprimand: 
[T]he district court made a finding and reached a legal conclusion that 
[the attorney] knowingly and wilfully violated a specific rule of ethical 
conduct.  Such a finding, per se, constitutes a sanction. . . . [It] bears 
greater resemblance to a reprimand than to a comment merely critical 
of inappropriate attorney behavior. . . . The requisite formality in this 
case is apparent from the fact that the trial court found a violation of a 
particular ethical rule, as opposed to generally expressing its disapproval 
of a lawyer’s behavior.
64
It distinguished its own prior holding in Weissman on the ground that 
in that case the appeal was from disparaging remarks but not a finding 
of misconduct.65  The court found that this expansion of appellate ju-
risdiction would still prevent the fears raised in Williams of reducing 
judicial candor by providing a clear line to trial judges regarding what 
can be appealed.66  The Ninth Circuit has clearly not flung wide the 
jurisdictional gates but has shifted what specific items in a judicial 
62 See Weissman v. Quail Lodge Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999). 
63 See, e.g., United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (allowing an 
appeal from a formal finding that an attorney had violated a specific state ethics rule).  
Importantly, in distinguishing the Ninth Circuit from the First and Federal Circuits, 
the finding at issue in Talao was not made as part of a sanction order against the attor-
ney.  Instead, the finding of misconduct was made when the court denied a motion to 
dismiss made by the other side.  Id. at 1137-38; accord United States v. Ensign, 491 F.3d 
1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Talao remains the law in this circuit.”). 
64 Talao, 222 F.3d at 1138 (italics omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
65 Id. at 1137-38.  Weissman involved an attempted appeal from both an actual 
sanction order and critical statements in the order as a separate basis for jurisdiction.  
While the court reversed the order on grounds that the attorney had been denied 
proper due process, it rejected his argument for jurisdiction based on the critical com-
ments in the order.  See Weissman, 179 F.3d at 1199 (concluding that the comments by 
the district court by themselves were not sanctions but rather “factual findings” sup-
porting the order, and declining to review such findings). 
66 Talao, 222 F.3d at 1138. 
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opinion can trigger an appeal by an attorney.  In fact, by emphasizing 
the need for a specific rule violation and characterizing such a finding 
as a “legal conclusion,” the Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence retains a fla-
vor of formalism.67
In Butler v. Biocore Medical Technologies, Inc., the Tenth Circuit also 
confronted a case involving an appeal from findings of misconduct 
without formal sanctions or reprimand.68  After reviewing the disposi-
tion of the circuits at the time, the court addressed the fears raised by 
Williams in allowing appeals from de facto sanctions.69  After stating 
that findings of misconduct are sufficiently injurious to reputation to 
give standing,70 the court turned to the problems of adversarial pro-
ceedings and excessive appellate-court interference with the conduct 
of trials.  It argued that since the appellate court would be reviewing 
the trial court’s order finding misconduct in addition to the appel-
lant’s brief, both sides would be represented without the need for an 
appellee brief.71  The court also decided that the deferential standard 
of review given to the imposition of sanctions would still leave the trial 
court with sufficient discretion to comment on attorneys’ conduct.72
67 Id. (“[A] formal finding of a violation eliminates the need for difficult line draw-
ing in much the same way as a court’s explicit pronouncement that its words are in-
tended as a sanction.”).  Arguably, the Ninth Circuit still belongs in the formalistic 
camp. See Pasquale, supra note 6, at 237-41 (placing the Ninth Circuit in the same 
category as the First and Federal Circuits).  However, the Ninth Circuit’s acceptance of 
a per se sanction seems at odds with the First Circuit’s formal-sanction requirement 
and rejection of de facto sanctions in Williams.  By allowing an appeal from a finding 
that was not expressly a sanction or part of a sanction order—something the First Cir-
cuit would not allow—the Ninth Circuit has potentially opened the door to allowing 
appeals from any explicit finding of attorney misconduct by the trial court. 
68 348 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2003). 
69 Id. at 1167-68.  Though it allowed the appeal, the Tenth Circuit, much like the 
Ninth, was adamant that appellate jurisdiction would not extend to criticism beyond 
findings of actual misconduct.  Id. at 1168. 
70 With respect to Williams on this point, the court stated that “a rule requiring an 
explicit label as a reprimand ignores the reality that a finding of misconduct damages 
an attorney’s reputation regardless of whether it is labeled as a reprimand and, instead, 
trumpets form over substance.”  Id. at 1169.  While I agree that Williams “trumpets 
form over substance,” I think that Butler mischaracterizes the Williams view on this 
point.  Williams did not base its holding on differences in reputational damage be-
tween a formal reprimand and a finding of misconduct.  The First Circuit settled on 
drawing the line at formal reprimands because it thought doing otherwise would result 
in an unworkable and uncabinable rule of appellate jurisdiction.  See Williams v. 
United States (In re Williams), 156 F.3d 86, 90-92 (1st Cir. 1998); supra Section II.B.  It 
was these concerns that led the Williams court to embrace form over substance and not 
the degree of injury to a lawyer’s reputation from one method of criticism or another. 
71 Butler, 348 F.3d at 1169. 
72 See id. (applying abuse of discretion as the standard of review). 
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While the opinions in Talao and Butler focus primarily on con-
cerns raised by allowing misconduct appeals, other circuits have de-
veloped affirmative rationales for expanding appellate jurisdiction to 
review findings of misconduct.  In the oft-cited case Walker v. City of 
Mesquite,73 the Fifth Circuit stressed both the value of reputation to an 
attorney74 and the systemic utility of reviewing findings regarding at-
torney conduct.75  The court also recognized its duty to monitor and 
discipline the conduct of attorneys practicing before it, and appellate 
courts’ consequent responsibility to review the use of this disciplinary 
power.76  The D.C. Circuit based its decision to allow appeals from 
findings of professional misconduct not on policy but on analogy, 
holding that such a finding “is not unlike that of an accused who is 
found guilty but with penalties suspended.  We conclude this gives 
[the attorney] standing to appeal.”77
D.  Summary 
Even though circuits have varying responses to the question of 
what to do with judicial criticism of attorneys, there is great uniformity 
in the types of concerns that the opinions raise.  Any attempt to re-
solve the circuit split will necessarily have to address them. 
The first concern, which nearly all circuits addressing the issue 
have overcome, is whether damage to reputation alone is enough to 
grant standing.78  Second, numerous courts have worried that pro-
73 129 F.3d 831 (5th Cir. 1997). 
74 Specifically, the court addressed the appellee’s argument, based on Seventh Cir-
cuit jurisprudence, that a monetary sanction is required to give standing.  The court 
characterized the monetary-sanction requirement: 
Stripped to essentials this proposition would maintain that an attorney has 
more of a reason and interest in appealing the imposition of a $100 fine than 
appealing a finding and declaration by a court that counsel is an unprofes-
sional lawyer prone to engage in blatant misconduct.  We reject this proposi-
tion out of hand, being persuaded beyond peradventure that one’s profes-
sional reputation is a lawyer’s most important and valuable asset. 
Id. at 832.  Why the plaintiff-appellee bothered to fight the misconduct finding in the 
first place is not clear from the opinion, but it calls into question the argument that 
such appeals will result in a lack of adversarial proceedings. 
75 Id. at 833 n.5. 
76 Id.
77 Sullivan v. Comm. on Admissions & Grievances, 395 F.2d 954, 956 (D.C. Cir. 
1967).
78 The Seventh Circuit is alone in finding reputational injury insufficient to grant 
standing, though it did not completely rule out the possibility.  See supra Section II.A. 
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ceedings will not be adversarial if actual (and particularly monetary) 
sanctions have not been imposed.79  Finally, the impact on trial 
courts80 and the potential for excessive expansion of appellate jurisdic-
tion warrant discussion.81
The next Part examines which approach best resolves these issues 
and best fits within the general appellate framework discussed in Part 
I.  As Part III demonstrates, the majority position of allowing attorneys 
to appeal specific findings of misconduct strikes the best balance be-
tween equity for the chastised lawyer and the needs (and framework) 
of the appellate system. 
III. ALLOW APPEAL FOR FINDINGS OF MISCONDUCT, BUT NO FURTHER
After reviewing the arguments put forth by the various circuits, 
the majority view,82 which allows an attorney to appeal a judicial find-
ing that she has engaged in professional misconduct, appears to be 
the best solution.  Exceptions to the general rules of appellate juris-
diction (involving nonparty appeals, review of judgments, and exis-
tence of injury) already exist that allow for such a formulation.83  Pol-
icy arguments, as identified by the appellate courts themselves,84
coupled with the weaknesses of other approaches, also recommend 
allowing appeals from findings of misconduct.  These rationales, how-
ever, do not support extending appellate jurisdiction to encompass 
other judicial criticism, no matter how severe. 
A.  Unsuitability of the Fine-Only and Formal-Reprimand Standards 
Before extolling the virtues and defending the vices of misconduct 
appeals, it is necessary to explain why the two more restrictive views 
should be rejected. 
79 See Williams v. United States (In re Williams), 156 F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 1998); 
Bolte v. Home Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 1984). 
80 Williams, 156 F.3d at 92. 
81 See Nisus Corp. v. Perma-Chink Sys., Inc., 497 F.3d 1316, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 
2007); Williams, 156 F.3d at 91; Bolte, 744 F.2d at 573. 
82 That is, the majority of circuits that have had the opportunity to decide the is-
sue.  This majority, however, is based on an artificial grouping that the circuits them-
selves might dispute.  With regards to allowing appeals from findings of misconduct, 
though, it seems that the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits would allow such an 
appeal. See supra Section II.C.  No other approach has garnered as broad support. 
83 See supra Part I. 
84 See supra Part II. 
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1.  The Fine-Only Standard 
The fact that only the Seventh Circuit requires monetary sanctions 
against an attorney in order to hear an appeal85 does not mean that 
the standard can be easily brushed aside.  Despite early speculation to 
the contrary,86 the Seventh Circuit seems quite attached to its posi-
tion.87  Its power derives from its consistency with the general rules of 
appellate jurisdiction discussed in Part I.  It fits into the exception for 
nonparty appeals from collateral judgments directed against them, 
since imposition of a monetary sanction certainly is a decision against 
the lawyer.88  An appeal from a monetary sanction is an appeal from a 
judgment, and not from a finding within the judgment.89  And, unlike 
potential reputational damage, a monetary fine is also a clear injury to 
the attorney.90  Indeed, the Seventh Circuit’s position is the common 
ground from which the other circuits depart.91
There are good grounds for those departures, however, and the 
Seventh Circuit’s own justifications for its position are not wholly satis-
fying.  Since the Bolte opinion seemed to concede both that damage to 
reputation might be sufficient to give standing and that formal find-
ings of misconduct realistically amount to a sanction,92 the court 
wound up, in effect, arguing that jurisdiction should be restricted in 
spite of the appeal’s apparent merit.  If the following two arguments, 
85 See supra Section II.A. 
86 As the Precision Specialty court noted, 
[W]e can not tell whether [the Seventh Circuit] would apply [the fine-only] 
principle where the attorney was actually reprimanded for the misconduct.  
When the Seventh Circuit decided Clark Equipment and the earlier Bolte case 
upon which it there relied, it did not have the benefit of the analysis of the 
subsequent cases from other circuits that we have discussed above. 
Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
87 See Seymour v. Hug, 485 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2007) (reaffirming the circuit’s 
commitment to the monetary sanction rule), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 302 (2007). 
88 See supra Section I.A. 
89 See supra Section I.B. 
90 See supra Section I.C. 
91 See supra Part II. 
92 See supra Section II.A.  While the court in Bolte seemed receptive to recognizing 
damages based on reputation, later opinions in the Seventh Circuit have used less fa-
vorable language.  See Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., 972 F.2d 817, 820 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (“[The attorney] has made only general allegations that he may suffer harm 
in the future.  These allegations represent no more than a speculative contingency, 
insufficiently real and immediate to show an existing controversy.” (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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identified by the Seventh Circuit, can be overcome, the rule collapses 
by its own logic. 
First, the Seventh Circuit expressed fear that anything other than 
a requirement of monetary sanctions would lead to an uncontrolla-
ble93 expansion of appellate jurisdiction, which would further increase 
the workload of already burdened appellate courts in this “age of con-
gested appellate dockets.”94  Expanding appeals to findings of miscon-
duct for litigation behavior, however, does not result in granting ap-
pellate review to all individuals criticized in court opinions; it merely 
changes where the jurisdictional line for an existing exception lies.  
Further, as discussed in more detail below, there are valid reasons to 
grant such appeals to attorneys litigating before the court while re-
stricting them for others.  As for congested courts, many other circuits 
have apparently not found the slight expansion in appellate jurisdic-
tion onerous.95  Since the dispute lies between the appellant and the 
court record, and since the standard of review is highly deferential, 
many of these cases likely could be disposed of without oral argu-
ments, further reducing the cost to the judiciary.96
The Seventh Circuit’s position regarding its second concern—the 
lack of adversarial proceedings—also seems untenable.  On the one 
hand, a party may, for various reasons, still wish to defend a ruling as 
an appellee.  This scenario actually happened in Bolte, despite the 
court’s inability to identify any benefit the appellee might gain from 
contesting the findings.97  More importantly, the adversarial posture 
the court desires may be lacking even with monetary sanctions.  If the 
fine is payable to the court itself, for example, the opposing party 
would have no tangible incentive to act as appellee. 
93 The court uses “uncontrollable” to mean that such an expansion could not be 
limited to just attorneys but would have to be open to all whom a judge might criticize.  
See Bolte v. Home Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 1984). 
94 Id.
95 See supra Section II.C (discussing the circuits and cases that have expanded ap-
pellate jurisdiction to hear misconduct appeals).  The fact that some courts have 
broadened their jurisdiction does not mean that the Seventh Circuit also has the re-
sources to do so, but it does call into question just how strong the rationale is for deny-
ing misconduct appeals. 
96 For examples of cases decided on their briefs, see Teaford v. Ford Motor Co., 338 
F.3d 1179, 1179 n.* (10th Cir. 2003) and United States v. Gonzales, 344 F.3d 1036, 1037 
n.* (10th Cir. 2003). 
97 Bolte, 744 F.2d at 573. 
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2.  The Formal-Reprimand Standard 
The position taken by the First Circuit in Williams, requiring a 
formal reprimand if no monetary sanctions are present,98 has fewer of 
the fine-only standard’s strengths and all of its weaknesses.  This rule’s 
crucial departure from that of the Seventh Circuit is the recognition 
of appeals without monetary sanctions, but the new line it draws to try 
to cabin the exception seems needlessly formalistic.  To be fair, the 
court was reacting to a suggestion that it acknowledge that judicial 
criticism could amount to a de facto sanction.99  In rejecting the de 
facto sanction, the court raised the same two arguments that the Sev-
enth Circuit had raised and noted its concern that accepting de facto 
sanctions would have a chilling effect on judicial candor.100  The prob-
lem with the First Circuit’s opinion is not that it rejected de facto 
sanctions101 but that it chose to enshrine a requirement of a formal 
reprimand.  If two attorneys are found to have engaged in misconduct 
but the court singles out only one to receive a formal reprimand, it is 
hard to justify why only that one should have the option of appellate 
review.  Just as with the Seventh Circuit’s position, concerns of cabin-
ing and adversarial proceedings are outweighed by the benefits of ap-
peals from misconduct findings.102  Nor, as the Ninth Circuit discussed 
in Talao, would allowing misconduct appeals have a greater chilling 
effect on judicial candor than requiring a formal reprimand.103  In 
short, once one has moved away from monetary sanctions, misconduct 
findings seem a better stopping point than formal reprimands. 
98 See supra Section II.B.  Even though some recent cases in the First Circuit show a 
shift toward greater recognition of sanctions even without a statement of formal rep-
rimand, see supra note 58, the importance of the Williams position to the historical de-
velopment of jurisprudence in this area and its frequent discussion in other circuits 
merit its review.  Of course, if the First Circuit is distancing itself from Williams, that 
move further undermines its credibility as a jurisdictional rule. 
99 See Williams v. United States (In re Williams), 156 F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(“Practically speaking, any rule that purports to transform harsh judicial words into a 
‘de facto sanction’ will be almost impossible to cabin.”). 
100 Id. at 91-92. 
101 The First Circuit’s rejection of de facto sanctions is a position with which I 
agree—and for some of the reasons identified in Williams. See infra Section III.B. 
102 See supra subsection III.A.1. 
103 See United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000); supra Section II.C. 
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B. Findings of Misconduct:  The New Jurisdictional Line 
While certain flaws in the other approaches help to make the mis-
conduct-findings standard look better, there are also solid arguments 
in its favor that make it more than just a default winner.  Positive ar-
guments emerge for allowing appeals from explicit findings of attor-
ney misconduct when the rule is placed in the larger context of appel-
late jurisdiction and review. 
1.  Legal Justification 
Allowing appeals from findings of misconduct can readily be rec-
onciled with existing appellate-jurisdiction guidelines and their excep-
tions.  Much like a formal sanction,104 a finding of misconduct is di-
rected at the nonparty attorney and not the client.  As the Ninth 
Circuit explained, it is a legal conclusion about that attorney and his 
conduct.105  Such a finding, with its harmful consequences, is sufficient 
to allow a nonparty to appeal as a collateral action under current ap-
pellate procedure jurisprudence.106
Also, the fact that the attorney appeals from findings in a judg-
ment, and not a judgment per se, should not raise the usual jurisdic-
tional red flags.  The attorney is not challenging mere wording in an 
opinion or the reasoning behind a judgment, but is instead challeng-
ing a finding of misconduct against her.  The situation is similar to 
that of an appeal by a prevailing party over other sufficiently negative 
rulings in the judgment; the attorney seeks review of an injurious de-
cision even if she is not aggrieved by the actual judgment.  As the Su-
preme Court recognized in Roper, it is possible for a potential appel-
lant to take an appeal, even if the judgment itself is not against her 
interests, as long as she retains a sufficient stake in the appeal.107  In a 
misconduct appeal, therefore, an attorney remains aggrieved even 
though the ultimate judgment in the case (relating to her client) 
might not be injurious to her.108  The attorney remains aggrieved 
104 See Nisus Corp. v. Perma-Chink Sys., Inc., 497 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(treating sanctions against an attorney as a judgment against the attorney for purposes 
of an appeal). 
105 Id.
106 See supra Section I.A. 
107 See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 334 (1980); supra Section I.B. 
108 But see Tannenbaum, supra note 6, at 1868-77 (rejecting the allowance of an 
appeal from any finding of misconduct as not adequately being an exception to the 
“judgments, not opinions” requirement).  Tannenbaum concludes that the exception 
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through the collateral findings of misconduct directed at the nonparty 
attorney.
Finally, a finding of misconduct does seem injurious to an attor-
ney’s reputation even if no additional monetary fines are imposed.  
Reputation is sufficient to grant standing for appeal given both the 
appellate courts’ position on the subject109 and the holdings of the Su-
preme Court in other areas of law.110  Nor should it generally matter 
whether an opinion is officially published or unpublished, since in an 
era of Westlaw, LexisNexis, and internet searches even an unpub-
lished opinion can cause significant reputational damage.111  As the 
Federal Circuit noted in Precision Specialty, “Unpublished opinions, al-
though not then reprinted in the West Publishing Company reports, 
may be, and frequently are, reported elsewhere.”112
in Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co. (which Roper builds upon) does not apply 
because “findings of misconduct involving nonparty attorneys do not qualify as a ruling 
on one of the issues litigated in the underlying case.”  Id. at 1871.  It is true that Roper
and Electrical Fittings described the findings that they are allowed to review as “adjudica-
tion[s] of one of the issues litigated.”  Roper, 445 U.S. at 336; Elec. Fittings Corp. v. 
Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241, 242 (1939).  Neither opinion, however, held this 
language out as a requirement for appeal, and the situation is distinguishable from 
nonparty-attorney appeals.  Both Roper and Electrical Fittings involved appeals by parties 
to the litigation, and both involved issues that were at stake in the underlying case.  A 
nonparty-attorney appeal coming from a collateral action against that attorney, on the 
other hand, is already distinct from the underlying litigation, so a requirement that an 
attorney could only appeal from one of the “issues litigated” in the case is inapplicable 
in this context. 
109 See, e.g., Walker v. City of Mesquite, 129 F.3d 831, 832 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding 
that the possibility of reputational damage is great enough to warrant permitting mis-
conduct appeals); see also Williams v. United States (In re Williams), 156 F.3d 86, 90-91 
(1st Cir. 1998) (concluding that while judicial criticism that merely “offends a lawyer’s 
sensibilities” and formal sanctions may both negatively impact an attorney’s reputation, 
only the latter are appealable).  But see Sterling Consulting Corp. v. IRS (In re Indian 
Motorcycle Co.), 452 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Reputational interests can be cogni-
zable; that is what defamation and expungement of record cases are about.  But merely 
to refer to reputation does not in this case denote a concrete threat, as it might if a 
lawyer were sanctioned and bar discipline was in prospect.” (footnote omitted)). 
110 See supra Section I.C (discussing First Amendment cases). 
111 There may be circumstances, though, where a misconduct finding is not widely 
available enough to create the reputational damage needed for standing.  An order or 
opinion which is not reported to Westlaw or LexisNexis, or is only available on PACER, 
might be insufficient depending on the facts of the case.  
112 315 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  The court noted further that 
“[a]lthough the opinion that contained the reprimand was unpublished, that fact 
should not insulate the trial court's action from judicial review.”  Id.
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2.  Appellate-Policy Rationale 
The policies of appellate review that the misconduct-findings rule 
promotes provide the strongest support for the rule’s adoption.113  In 
addition to improving equity by allowing an unfairly maligned attor-
ney to seek relief,114 this jurisdictional limit serves important goals of 
the appellate system better than either of the fine-only or formal rep-
rimand standards.  Judge Hufstedler, formerly of the Ninth Circuit, 
identified two roles that appellate systems play:  reviewing for errors in 
a particular case and serving broader institutional functions.115  Appel-
late courts perform these institutional functions by hearing cases in 
which they interpret the law authoritatively, set policy, and supervise 
the lower courts.116
The function of reviewing for errors in decisions is clearly best 
served by hearing appeals from misconduct findings.  These are legal 
conclusions, and they often form the basis for more formal sanctions 
like monetary fines.  A review of a formal sanction would have to look 
at the correctness of the findings of misconduct in any case.  It makes 
more sense to allow appellate courts to review these findings for errors 
by the trial court directly than it does to require that the trial judge 
choose a particular method of punishment before allowing review of 
the findings.  As noted by the Fifth Circuit in Walker, the true damage 
to a lawyer comes from these findings of misconduct and not from the 
“$100 fine.”117
Reviewing findings of attorney misconduct also furthers several 
important institutional goals.  First, it provides attorneys with clearer 
expectations of what conduct is acceptable.  As the Walker court em-
phasized, “we have a strong interest in hearing cases such as this be-
cause of our duty to assure that lawyers, as officers of the court, live up 
to their ethical responsibilities.”118  While an appellate court applies an 
“abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district 
113 Cf. Pasquale, supra note 6, at 242-48 (describing different rationales for a simi-
lar jurisdictional limit on appeals from judicial criticism). 
114 Based on the appropriately deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of review, 
the attorney would still face a difficult burden in overcoming the trial court’s findings.  
An attorney may also risk making the damage worse by seeking appellate review, which 
would further publicize his alleged misdeeds. 
115 Shirley M. Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids:  Reshaping the Judicial System,
44 S. CAL. L. REV. 901, 910 (1971). 
116 Id.
117 Walker v. City of Mesquite, 129 F.3d 831, 832 (5th Cir. 1997). 
118 Id. at 833 n.5. 
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court's Rule 11 determination,”119 allowing review of a misconduct 
finding, even under a deferential review standard, would still provide 
the court with an opportunity to discuss the conduct and relevant le-
gal standards.  As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmarx Corp., which set the abuse of discretion standard for at least 
Rule 11 sanctions, “this standard would not preclude the appellate 
court's correction of a district court's legal errors” since a court abuses 
its discretion “if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law 
. . . .”120  Since findings of misconduct will often involve interpreting 
ethical rules, a court of appeals can still engage in substantial discus-
sion of how those standards should be interpreted.121  The more re-
strictive approaches would hamper this institutional function in two 
ways:  they result in fewer cases and therefore create fewer opinions to 
guide both attorneys and courts,122 and they are too narrowly focused 
on the imposition of a fine or formal sanction rather than the attor-
ney’s actual conduct. 
Second, appellate review acts as a check on potential excess by 
trial courts, which wield vast discretion in this area and which could 
otherwise avoid review by stopping short of formal sanctions.  The re-
putational harm to a sanctioned attorney can be severe (even if sanc-
tioned informally) and appellate review is necessary to make sure that, 
in the particular case, censure is appropriate.123
119 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990).  The Cooter & Gell
court rejected the use of a “three-tiered standard of review” based on whether a ques-
tion of fact, law, or mixed question of law and fact was being reviewed.  Id.
120 Id. at 402, 405. 
121 See, e.g., Butler v. Biocore Med. Techs., Inc., 348 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(referencing Cooter & Gell for the abuse of discretion standard it said it was applying, 
but reviewing de novo the trial court's interpretation of the ethical rules involved in its 
findings of misconduct). 
122 One potential, but self imposed, obstacle to courts of appeals providing greater 
clarity on attorney conduct is the fact that they make about 80% of their opinions 
nonprecedential.  See Sarah E. Ricks, The Perils of Unpublished Non-Precedential Federal Ap-
pellate Opinions:  A Case Study of the Substantive Due Process State-Created Danger Doctrine In 
One Circuit, 81 WASH. L. REV. 217, 223 (2006).  This trend has ramifications well be-
yond the topic of this Comment.  However, even if courts of appeals issue few prece-
dential opinions reviewing misconduct findings, their unpublished opinions can still 
provide guidance.  Presumably an opinion by a court of appeals that certain actions 
constitute misconduct would influence the prudent attorney whether the opinion is 
published or unpublished. 
123 See 1-10 Indus. Assocs. v. United States, 528 F.3d 859, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Just 
as it is the duty of the court imposing sanctions to do so only when truly warranted, it is 
our duty on appeal to review the facts of such a case with great care to determine 
whether a sanction has been properly imposed.”).  While the court was reviewing a 
Rule 11 violation, the logic should also apply to misconduct findings generally. 
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Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit concluded in Talao, hearing mis-
conduct rulings will not result in a chilling effect on judicial candor, 
as the Williams court worried,124 because doing so still provides a clear 
rule for the kind of judicial findings that trigger an appeal.125  Nor, as 
the Tenth Circuit pointed out in Butler, would hearing misconduct 
appeals lead to “excessive appeals.”126  The deferential standard of re-
view, particularly for factual and credibility findings, coupled with the 
increased damage to an attorney’s reputation from a loss at the appel-
late level, would act to keep the level of frivolous appeals to a mini-
mum and allow the district court to continue to maintain order.127  In 
fact, by hearing these appeals, the appellate courts would also provide 
useful feedback to the district courts regarding what constitutes attor-
ney misconduct and district court abuse of discretion.128
Expanding appellate review beyond monetary sanctions or formal 
reprimand both feeds the appellate courts more opportunities to set 
law and focuses review directly on what conduct is allowed, which has 
institutional value, rather than on whether the punishment was appro-
priate, which has limited value beyond the facts of that particular case. 
3.  Non- and Prior-Litigation Misconduct 
Not all findings by a court that an attorney has engaged in mis-
conduct should be per se reviewable.  It may happen that an attorney 
who is not a party and who does not represent the party before the 
court still receives an adverse finding.  The justifications for allowing 
an attorney, and only an attorney, to appeal for a misconduct finding 
are weakened when the conduct involved did not arise during the 
current litigation.  This was precisely the scenario faced by the Federal 
Circuit in Nisus Corp. v. Perma-Chink Systems, Inc., where an attorney 
was found to have engaged in misconduct during the filing of a patent 
124 See United States v. Williams (In re Williams), 156 F.3d 86, 91-92 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(“The net result would be tantamount to declaring open season on trial judges.”). 
125 See United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (arguing that 
judicial candor will not be compromised because judges would likely be aware of the 
bright line appealability of formal findings); see also Pasquale, supra note 6, at 245-47 
(arguing that judicial candor would not be compromised under such a similar 
scheme).
126 Butler, 348 F.3d at 1169. 
127 Id.
128 See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS, 53 
(1981) (“The ‘questions of law’ passed on to the appeals courts are in reality requests 
for uniform rules of social conduct and indicators of what range of case-by-case devia-
tion from the rules is permissible by first-line controllers.”). 
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application.129  The only role that the attorney played during the trial, 
however, was as a witness.130  It is difficult to justify allowing an attor-
ney to appeal from such a situation, but not allow an appeal by other 
witnesses or third parties who have findings of misconduct against 
them.131  A court’s interest in controlling the courtroom, and the ap-
pellate court’s interest in reviewing the conduct of attorneys appear-
ing before it, is not as heavily implicated here as it is where an attorney 
is sanctioned for his conduct directly before the court.  In these cases, 
attorneys must remain in the same position as other third parties.132
C. Further Expansion Is Also Unworkable 
The de facto sanction option, which the Williams court rejected,133
has not been adopted by any circuit.  One could imagine a jurisdic-
tional rule that would look at the aggregate of judicial criticism and 
weigh whether it amounted to (or was intended to be) a sanction or 
not.  It also seems plausible that criticism alone could reach the level 
of a sanction, at least in terms of intent and impact on the attorney.  
Take, for example, the somewhat extreme case of Bradshaw v. Unity 
Marine Corp.134  In the opinion, the district judge called attorneys for 
both parties “amateurish” and said that their pleadings were “child-
129 497 F.3d 1316, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
130 Id. at 1321. 
131 One illustrative example of the attorney as a true third party, pointed out to me 
by Judge Louis Pollak, of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, is the ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim.  In order to succeed, the defendant must show that her attor-
ney’s conduct was not just deficient, but so deficient that it violated the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984).  The attorney, while often a key witness in the proceedings, is not a party to 
them. See Harrelson v. United States, 967 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (denying 
prior counsel’s request to intervene in ineffective assistance of counsel proceedings 
despite possible harm to counsel’s reputation).  Even though the attorney’s conduct is 
the central point of inquiry, “the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the 
Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation, although that 
is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system.  The purpose is simply to en-
sure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  The 
Strickland court declined to adopt explicit guidelines for evaluating attorney conduct. 
132 If, for example, the attorney has a sufficient interest in a civil proceeding, she 
could always attempt to intervene in the litigation to protect her rights.  See FED. R. CIV.
P. 24. 
133 Williams v. United States (In re Williams), 156 F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 1998). 
134 147 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D. Tex. 2001). 
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like.”135  The opinion continues in that tone, leaving no doubt as to 
the judge’s opinion of their professional competence.  If criticism 
alone could rise to the level of public reprimand, this opinion would 
be the prime example.  Assuming for the sake of argument that the 
attorneys’ conduct was unfairly mischaracterized, does it make sense 
to grant them appellate review? 
In such a case, the issues of vast expansion of appellate jurisdic-
tion and negative effects on judicial candor would become relevant.136
While one could try to limit the exception to lawyers based on their 
role as officers of the court and the court’s role in regulating their 
behavior, this policy rationale has less force since it is not based on ac-
tual misconduct.  Why should a lawyer be allowed to appeal from a 
finding that her testimony is “pure baloney,”137 but an ordinary witness 
not?  Especially if that witness were an expert witness, her reputational 
concerns could be just as great as a lawyer’s if the opinion was critical 
enough.  Since there can be no clear guidance to a trial judge as to 
when criticism goes so far as to constitute a sanction, there is a much 
greater chance that judges would pull their punches to avoid getting 
involved in appeals, with the result that their ability to control the 
courtroom and criticize worthy targets would be hindered.  Such a 
standard seems unworkable in practice. 
In addition, once an appellate court departs from actual findings 
of misconduct, it also largely departs from its ability to review mean-
ingfully the lower court’s opinion.  What standard should—or could—
an appellate court apply to a statement, for example, that an attorney 
should avoid running with sharp objects?138  It clearly implicates the 
attorney’s professional ability; but such criticism, lacking an allegation 
of specific objectionable conduct, may be effectively unreviewable.139
135 Id. at 670.  After observing that both attorneys had “draft[ed] their pleadings 
entirely in crayon on the back sides of gravy-stained paper place mats,” the court ex-
pressed its displeasure at the pleadings’ “utter dearth of legal authorities.”  Id.
136 On its face, appeals from de facto sanctions (or simple criticisms) would seem 
at greatest odds with the general jurisdictional rules of Part I, since they would be ap-
peals from pure judicial criticism.  But if one accepts that a criticism rises to a level 
such that it actually counts as a sanction, then it fits within those rules at least as well as 
actual findings of misconduct, much as misconduct findings are de jure sanctions.  
The problem is less with the general jurisdictional rules than with the inherent vague-
ness of how much criticism is too much. 
137 Williams, 156 F.3d at 88. 
138 See Bradshaw, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 672 n.4. 
139 The possibility of obtaining a writ of mandamus, however, is an option that 
even the restrictive Seventh Circuit would allow.  See Bolte v. Home Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 
572, 573 (7th Cir. 1984) (recognizing mandamus as the proper remedy, but noting 
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CONCLUSION
The circuits are split on what kind of judicial criticism is sufficient 
to provide appellate jurisdiction.  All agree that imposition of mone-
tary sanctions is appealable.140  The Seventh Circuit chooses to go no 
further.141  An attorney who was found to have engaged in misconduct 
would be able to appeal those findings in most circuits that have con-
sidered the issue,142 but not in circuits following the reasoning in Wil-
liams.143  No circuit would allow an appeal by an attorney criticized but 
not found to have engaged in misconduct, or by an attorney found to 
have engaged in misconduct, but not in actions before the court. 
Of these approaches, the one allowing appellate jurisdiction over 
findings of misconduct does the best job of mitigating legitimate con-
cerns—not being able to cabin appellate jurisdiction and unduly limit-
ing judicial candor—while still providing the policy benefits from ap-
pellate review of attorney conduct.  It provides a clear standard of 
appellate jurisdiction for district courts writing opinions, attorneys 
contemplating appeals, and appellate courts facing crowded dockets.  
For these reasons, appellate courts that have yet to consider the issue 
would do well to adopt this standard and the minority circuits ought 
to start moving towards it. 
that such a prior request for such a writ was properly refused).  But see Pasquale, supra
note 6, at 247-48 (finding writs of mandamus to be insufficient remedies).
140 See supra Part II. 
141 See supra Section II.A. 
142 See supra Section II.C. 
143 See supra Section II.B. 
